Friday, July 29, 2016
2:04 PM (3 hours ago)
Please Please Please give some time and read this article and do take remedial actions, before it is too late to retrieve OUR MAHAAN BHARATH drifting into deep deep sea, due to the so called steel (rusted) frame.
G V Narayana
Piping Ceremony at South Block in the presence of Chief of Army Staff General Dalbir S Suhag. #TerritorialArmy
(SOURCE- FROM tWITTER A/C OF LT ANURAG THAKUR)
Text Of Letter Dated October 26, 1947 From Hari Singh, The Maharaja Of Jammu & Kashmir to Lord Mountbatten, Governor General of India.
Dated: 26 October 1947
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I have to inform your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request immediate assistance of your Government.
As your Excellency is aware the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to the Dominion of India or to Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous to both the Dominions. It has jvital economical and cultural llinks with both of them. Besides my State has a common boundary with the Soviet Republic and China. In their external relations the Dominions of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact.
I wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion I should accede, or whether it is not in the best interests of both the Dominions and my State to stand independent, of course with friendly and cordial relations with both.
I accordingly approached the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter into Standstill Agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted this Agreement. The Dominion of India desired further discussions with representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this in view of the developments indicated below. In fact the Pakistan Government are operating Post and Telegraph system inside the State.
Though we have got a Standstill Agreement with the Pakistan Government that Government permitted steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to my State.
Afridis, solidiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern weapons have been allowed to infilter into the State at first in Poonch and then in Sialkot and finally in mass area adjoining Hazara District on the Ramkot side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at the several points simultaneously, that it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and looting. The Mahora powerhouse which supplies the electric current to the whole of Srinagar has been burnt. The numer of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer Capital of my Government, as first step to over-running the whole State.
The mass infiltration of tribesmen drawn from distant areas of the North-West Frontier coming regularly in motor trucks using Mansehra-Muzaffarabad Road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provisional Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of Pakistan. In spite of repeated requests made by my Government no attempt has been made to check these raiders or stop them from coming into my State. The Pakistan Radio even put out a story that a Provinsional Government had been set up in Kashmir. The people of my State both the Muslims and non-Muslims generally have taken no part at all.
With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the grreat emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and my people to free-booters. On this basis no civilized Government can exist or be maintained. This alternative I will never allow to happen as long as I am Ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country.
I am also to inform your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim Government and ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.
If my State has to be saved immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. Mr. Menon is fully aware of the situation and he will explain to you, if further explanation is needed.
In haste and with kind regards,
The Palace, Jammu Your sincerely,26th October, 1947 Hari Singh(Source- By Promod Agarwal & Via fwd e-mail from Bharat Bhushan Ghai Vet)
Thursday, July 28, 2016
Who is more Capable : As a citizen I always see The Army being called to hold the Pants of The Civil Services and The Police and Never the Other Way round. We need a permanent solution to this tussle over emoluments so that the armed forces need only confront the enemies of the nation, says T.R.Ramaswami IAS.
How much differential is there?
Take Maharashtra, one of the most parsimonious with police ranks thus still retaining some merit -
The 1981 IPS batch have become 3-star generals, the 1987 are 2-star and the 1994 1-star.
In the army the corresponding years are 1972, 1975, 1979. ie a differential of 10-15 years. While the differential is more with the IAS, the variance with the IPS is all the more glaring because both are uniformed services and the grades are "visible" on the shoulders.
First some general aspects.
Only the armed forces are a real profession, i.e. where you rise to the top only by joining at the bottom. We have had professors of economics become Finance Secretaries or even Governors of RBI. We have any number of MBBSs,engineers, MBAs, in the police force though what their qualifications lend to their jobs is a moot point.
You can join at any level in the civil service, except Cabinet Secretary. A civil servant can move from Animal Husbandry to Civil Aviation to Fertilisers to Steel to yes, unfortunately, even to Defence.
But the army never asks for Brigade Commanders or a Commandant of the Army War College or even Director General Military Intelligence, even from RAW or IB. Army officers can and have moved into organizations like IB and RAW but it is never the other way round. MBBS and Law graduates are only in the Medical or JAG Corps and do nothing beyond their narrow areas.
Every Army Chief - in any army - has risen from being a commander of a platoon to company to battalion to brigade to division to corps to army.In fact the professionalism is so intense that no non-armoured corps officer ever commands an armoured formation , first and possibly only exception in world military history is General K. Sunderji.
Perhaps it is this outstanding professionalism that irks the civil services.
Next, one must note the rigidity and steep pyramid of the army's rank structure.
In the civil services any post is fungible with any grade based on political expediency and the desires of the service.
For example I know of one case where one department downgraded one post in another state and up-graded one in Mumbai just to enable someone continue in Mumbai after promotion!
You can't fool around like this in the armed forces. A very good Brigadier cannot be made a Major-General and continue as brigade commander. There has to be a clear vacancy for a Major General and even then there may be others better than him. Further the top five ranks in the army comprise only 10% of the officer strength.
Contrast this with the civil services where entire batches become Joint Secretaries.
Even the meaning of the word "merit" is vastly different in the army and the civil services.
Some years back an officer of the Maharashtra cadre claimed that he should be the Chief Secretary as he was first in the merit list.Which merit list? At the time of entry more than 35 years before! The fact is that this is how merit is decided in the IAS and IPS. Every time a batch gets promoted the inter-se merit is still retained as at the time of entry. In other words if you are first in a batch at the time of entry, then as long as you get promoted, you continue to remain first!
This is like someone in the army claiming that he should become chief because he got the Sword of Honour at the IMA. Even a Param Vir Chakra does not count for promotion, assuming that you are still alive. In the armed forces, merit is a continuous process - each time a batch is promoted the merit list is redrawn according to your performance in all the previous assignments with additional weightage given not only to the last one but also to your suitability for the next one.Thus if you are a Brigade Commander and found fit to become a Major General, you may not get a division because others have been found better to head a division. That effectively puts an end to your promotion to Lt. General.
The compensation package must therefore address all the above issues. In each service, anyone must get the same total compensation by the time he reaches the 'mode rank' of his service. "Mode" is a statistical term it is the value where the maximum number of variables fall.
In the IAS normally everyone reaches Director and in the IPS it is DIG.
In the army, given the aforementioned rank and grade rigidities and pyramidical structure, the mode rank cannot exceed Colonel. Thus a Colonel's gross career earnings (not salary scales alone) must be at par with that of a Director.
But remember that a Colonel retires at 54, but every babu from peon to Secretary at 60 regardless of performance.Further, it takes 18-20 years to become a Colonel whereas in that time an IAS officer reaches the next higher grade of Joint Secretary, which is considered equal to a Major General.
These aspects and others - like postings in non-family stations - must be addressed while fixing the overall pay scales of Colonel and below.
Thereafter a Brigadier will be made equal to a Joint Secretary, a Major-General to an Additional Secretary and a Lt. General to a Secretary.
The Army Commanders deserve a new rank -Colonel General - and should be above a Secretary but below Cabinet Secretary.
The equalization takes place at the level of Cabinet Secretary and Army Chief.
If this is financially a problem I have another solution. Without increasing the armed forces' scales, reduce the scales of the IAS and IPS till they too have 20% shortage. Done?
Even India 's corruption index will go down.
If the above is accepted in principle, there is a good case to review the number of posts above Colonel. Senior ranks in the armed forces have become devalued with more and more posts being created. But the same pruning exercise is necessary in the IAS and more so in the IPS, where Directors General in some states are re-writing police manuals eg one is doing Volume I and another Volume II!
Further the civil services have such facilities as "compulsory wait" ie basically a picnic at taxpayers cost. And if you are not promoted or posted where you don't want to go they seem able to take off on leave with much ease.
In the army you will be court-martialled. Also find out how many are on study leave. The country cannot afford this.
Let not someone say that the IAS and IPS exams are tougher and hence the quality of the officers better. An exam at the age of 24 has to be tougher than one at the age of 16.
The taxpaying citizen is not interested in your essay/note writing capabilities or whether you know Cleopatra's grandfather.
As a citizen I always see the army being called to hold the pants of the civil services and the police and never the other way round. That's enough proof as to who is really more capable.
Also recall the insensitive statements made by the IG Meerut in the Aarushi case and the Home Secretary after the blasts.
Further, when the IAS and IPS hopefuls are sleeping, eating and studying, their school mates, who have joined the army, stand vigil on the borders to make it possible for them to do so.
Remember that the armed forces can only fight for above the table pay. They can never compete with the civil services and definitely not with the police for the under the table variety.
Finally, there is one supreme national necessity. The political class, not the bureaucracy - which represents the real civil supremacy better become more savvy on matters relating to the armed forces. Till then they are at the mercy of the civil service, who frequently play their own little war games.
At ministerial level there are some very specialized departments eg Finance, Railways,Security (Home), Foreign and Defence, where split second decisions are necessary. It is always possible to find netas savvy in finance, foreign relations and railways.
Security has been addressed in getting a former IPS officer as NSA at the level of a MoS. Is it time that a professional is also brought into the Defence Ministry as MoS? The sooner the better.
In fact this will be better than a CoDS because the armed forces will have someone not constrained by the Army Act or Article 33 of the Constitution.Of course the loudest howls will come from the babus. The netas must realize that a divide and rule policy cannot work where the country's security is concerned. Recall 1962?
Our army, already engaged in activities not core to their functions, including rescuing babies from borewells, should not have to engage in civil wars over their pay scales.
I only hope our defence minister or anyone who would take a reasonable stand for defence forces ever gets to see this article.
It would definitely affect any person with an iota of integrity.....
(Source- Via e-mail from BHARAT BHUSHAN GHAI VET)
Some of the young people who met Home Minister Rajnath Singh in Srinagar last weekend were encouraged by his attentiveness and apparent openness. That might sound good but, sadly, it makes little difference. Those meetings were too little, too late. The bottom line is that the home ministry has failed in Kashmir. It has failed on several fronts over several years, but its worst failure was missing the crucial importance of catching Burhan Wani alive. They made the cardinal error of viewing him as simply another militant commander, rather than as an idealised youth icon the like of which Kashmir had not seen in a quarter-century.
Engaging with young Kashmiris at large is the right thing to do, but doing it at this point is like trying to reap a crop after birds and cows have picked the field clean. The minister’s meetings last weekend might deserve full marks for attitude, but also a zero for effectiveness – and the maximum negative for timing. If the country is lucky, there might be a re-test for this ministry in Kashmir at some point but that point seems distant. Nor, given its inefficiency over the past several decades, is there much hope that it will pass.
For the longest time, three ministries have dealt with Kashmir – unfortunately, spending more energy sniping at each other over turf than on problem-solving. Apart from home, these ministries are external affairs and defence.
Diplomacy over Kashmir has already faltered badly. Just a few months after the prime minister’s high-profile visit to Pakistan last Christmas, Pakistan declared that it had suspended talks with India. If the home minister’s visit was too little too late, the prime minster’s visit seven months earlier had been too much too late.
A statement from the external affairs minister the day after the home minister visited Kashmir blamed Pakistan. The focus ought indeed to be on Pakistan — but it should be the defence ministry’s focus, not the home ministry’s, the external affairs ministry’s, or the information and broadcasting ministry’s. To blame Pakistan for the unrest in the Valley is a convenient but inadequate explanation.
What might happen next is more to the point.
Policymakers need to urgently figure out what signals the Pakistan Army would have taken from the sharp and massive uprising that followed Burhan Wani’s killing. In light of those likely signals, the defence ministry ought to brainstorm, and draw up detailed response plans.
A good reference point is what happened in 1965.
The war and Operation Gibraltar that Pakistan launched that year to try and take over Kashmir, was a response to the signals Pakistan’s General Headquarters received over the previous couple of years.
The first signal was the extraordinarily volatile protests in Kashmir when the relic of the Prophet went missing from the Hazratbal shrine on 27 December, 1963. The second signal was Nehru’s death exactly five months later, and the succession to power of Lal Bahadur Shastri; Pakistan perceived Shastri as a pushover.
Another important signal was the government’s behaviour towards Sheikh Abdullah during 1964. He was released from jail in April, went to Pakistan in May with a peace proposal involving joint management (similar to the so-called 'Musharraf Plan'), and was jailed again after he met Chou en Lai in Egypt.
Intense shelling on the Ceasefire Line (now called the Line of Control) continued from the summer of 1964 until Operation Gibraltar unfolded between July and September the next year. For Pakistan’s army, the most important spur in that phase must surely have been the high-pitched public response while the relic was missing.
Let us compare this with the current scenario. Until 2008, Pakistan had all but given up on Kashmir. That summer’s uprising — kicked off by Governor SK Sinha’s insistence on land transfer to the Sri Amarnath Shrine Board, and reinvigorated by the RSS’s electorally motivated campaign in the Jammu region — signalled to Pakistani strategists that opportunity still knocked in Kashmir.
By the time the closure of the highway near Udhampur and Samba led to a 'Muzaffarabad chalo' march in Kashmir, Pakistan was back in the role of puppeteer — to some extent, at least. Its role increased during the uprising of 2010.
The period since 2008 has brought several ominous indications:
One, a fresh, highly motivated militancy is underway in Kashmir.
Two, there have been sharp attacks at security installations along the arterial highway to the state.
Three, large numbers of militant camps are once more bustling across the Line of Control.
Four, Chinese troops are stationed in parts of the state controlled by Pakistan.
Five, Pakistan has been furiously preparing battlefield nuclear weapons.
If the home ministry buried its head ostrich-like in the sands of illusion before Burhan’s killing, the defence ministry would do well not to follow that example in light of these indications, and the uprising that followed Burhan’s killing.